AD Warning-Tactics & U of F [004-15]

Short Story:  The officers received a radio call from the Fire Department that they were responding to a call where a male had locked himself in the bathroom with a knife, threatening suicide. The suspect’s brother briefed the Fire Department captain.  The captain knocked on the bathroom door.  The suspect opened it and the captain noted that the suspect was naked and had dried blood on his body.  The suspect inquired if the Fire Department had a gun so they could shoot him, then closed the door.  Officers and Sergeant A arrived and deployed around the door and covered the rear window.  Sergeant A heard a noise in the bathroom, but the suspect did not respond.  Sergeant A did not know if this failure was willful, or if the suspect was down and bleeding out.  He decided that exigent circumstances existed and decided to breach the door.  Sergeant A deployed officers around the door, one equipped with a TASER.  Officer F kicked the bathroom door.  The suspect was holding a knife, screaming, and covered with blood.  Officer D ordered the suspect to drop his knife.  The suspect replied, “you are going to have to shoot me!”  Several officers repeatedly told the suspect to drop the knife.  Officer C observed the knife fall to the floor and announced, “the knife is down.”  The suspect began to exit the bathroom in the direction of the officers.  Sergeant A yelled “TASER him.”  Officer B activated the TASER.  Officer F observed the suspect cross the threshold of the bathroom in the direction of the officers and, still believing he had the knife, fired one shot as the TASER was fired.  The suspect went down.  He got up and continued advancing.  He was TASERed two more times before the officers were able to handcuff him.  BOPC Finding: Tactic and U of F:   1) Sergeant A did not effectively communicate with the officers assigned to the team about their specific roles.  He gave them multiple conflicting responsibilities. 2) Sergeant A had a barricaded suspect and did not request additional resources. 3) Sergeant A did not conduct a thorough assessment of the situation and decided to breach the door.  He did not contact the Mental Evaluation Unit nor SWAT for advice.  4) It was not reasonable for Officer F to believe there was an imminent threat of death without seeing the knife.


AD Warning-Tactics [002-15]

Short Story: A victim reported that he had been kidnapped by a suspect armed with a gun.  He had escaped and the suspect was still inside an abandoned building.  Officers surrounded the building and requested SWAT and an air unit.  SWAT arrived and swapped out the patrol officers from the perimeter.  In the meantime, the air unit had found the suspect’s car.  Sergeant B was monitoring the car.  Upon being relieved by SWAT, Officers A and B joined Sergeant B in monitoring the car. Sergeant B informed them that a witness had noticed a gate open on some abandoned property next to the suspect location.  Sergeant B instructed Officers A and B to check that out in case the suspect had escaped the SWAT perimeter.  No one notified the command post of this because Sergeant B felt it was beyond the area that the suspect was supposed to be in.  The officers observed a shed and opened the door to check it out.  The suspect was viewed pointing a gun at the shed door.  The officers advised communications.  SWAT responded and utilized gas.  SWAT Officer N fired 3 rounds at the suspect.  The suspect eventually surrendered.  BOPC Finding: AD on Tactics: 1) Sergeant B and Officers A and B did not notify SWAT or the Command Post that they were going to check out the adjacent property. 2) Officer B, after viewing suspect with a weapon began giving orders to the suspect, exposing himself instead of redeploying. 3) Sergeant B violated command and control by allowing officers to search the adjacent property without sufficient resources, helmets, or notification to SWAT of the Command Post.

AD Warning-AD UD [001-15]

SHORT STORY:  Officers responded to an ADW in progress three suspects in possession of handguns.  As they arrived, they received word that one of the suspects had run into a market.  The officers surrounded the market.  Officer E removed the shotgun from its rack and chambered a round.  He loaded a round into the shotgun from the butt-cuff.  He took the safety off and placed his finger along the frame because he felt that the armed suspect may come out of the building shooting (a rear door was open).  While re-positioning himself, he slipped.  As he attempted to regain his balance, his finger wrapped around the trigger and he had an unintentional discharge into the ground.  BOPC FINDING: AD on Unintentional Discharge:  Operator error. Violation of Department’s Basic Firearm Safety Rules.

October 2017 Warning Bells article


Did you realize that 52 percent of Categorical Uses of Force are Administratively Disapproved for at least one officer, and usually more than one? The standard for Administrative Disapproval is that an officer has “substantially deviated from Department policy or training without justification.” A 52 percent failure rate in private industry would immediately result in the termination of every manager involved. In the government, however, you know what rolls downhill instead.

On the surface, LAPD officers must all be dunderheads who cannot be trained to have a failure rate that high. Eighty-eight Categorical Uses of Force for 2015 have been posted on the Police Commission’s website. Forty-six contain Administrative Disapprovals for one or more officers. Since the Categorical Use of Force protocol takes around 10 months to complete, 2015 is the last complete year of adjudications. The 2016 figures are not yet completed, but of the 40 cases posted so far on the Commission’s website, 19 of them contain Administrative Disapprovals for one or more officers (47.5 percent failure rate). There is little reason to believe that 2016 will end up any different than 2015.

For review, the road to Administrative Disapproval goes like this. A Categorical Use of Force occurs. Officers are all separated and Force Investigation Division (FID) responds and interviews everyone involved and conducts an investigation. All interviews are transcribed and included in a report that addresses every aspect of the incident (often approaching 1,000 pages). The investigation goes to the officer’s commanding officer (CO), who reviews it and determines what his/her recommendation will be in three areas: tactics, drawing and exhibiting a weapon, and the use of force itself. The CO makes recommendations in each of the three areas to the Use of Force Review Board. The Use of Force Review Board makes a recommendation to the Chief of Police, and the Chief makes his recommendation to the Police Commission. The Police Commission makes the final decision and posts that decision on the internet, minus the officer’s name. The initial recommendation of the Use of Force Review Board is almost always accepted by the Chief, and the Chief’s recommendation is almost always accepted by the Police Commission. Cases that have gone political are the exception.

Administrative Disapprovals are not good for your career (see the March 2017 Warning Bells article for a full discussion). So, how do we fix this? The first step is to identify the problem. Is it a lack of training? Is it that LAPD officers are untrainable? Is it that the adjudicators (Use of Force Review Board members, Chief of Police and Police Commission) themselves do not understand the policy? Is it that the adjudicator’s expectations of perfection cannot be attained by officers who are human beings? Is it political in that Department managers want to appear to be tough on uses of force to make themselves look good to Police Commissioners who will be selecting the next Chief of Police, and who know that the Police Commission has never seen a use of force that it likes? Is it the Police Commissioners who have never been in a dark alley where someone is trying to kill them and have no frame of reference to understand the conditions under which officers make the use of force decisions they make? Who are the dunderheads?

LAPD officers are probably the best trained in the nation. Given the catastrophic failure rate in use of force adjudications, it is obvious that there is no familiarity with the troops on what the standards are upon which they will be judged. Lawyers learn how to predict results in legal cases by reading the appellate court’s decisions and trying to find the common factors used to arrive at their adjudications. Maybe the same thing needs to be done by street officers.

With that in mind, I analyzed all the Administrative Disapprovals (ADs) posted by the Police Commission in 2015. The short story of each use of force and the reasons for the adjudication are posted on my website, including a summary chart of reasons for the AD. The overwhelming number of ADs are from officer-involved shootings (59 percent), followed by a tie between law enforcement-related injuries (LERIs) and unintentional discharges (UDs) at a distant 15 percent. Of the three areas being adjudicated—tactics, use of force and drawing and exhibiting—tactics capture the most ADs (85 percent), with use of force coming in second with 26 percent. An analysis of the reasons for the AD adjudication reveals that the big four reasons mentioned are 1) failure of partners to communicate during the incident (33 percent), 2) no Code 6 (26 percent), 3) no discussion of tactics prior to the incident (22 percent), and 4) failure to wait for additional resources before acting (22 percent). There were 37 additional sets of reasons that I could also identify, ranging from failure to wear vests through separation issues. The number of ways to screw up, in the Police Commission’s view, appear to be endless.

My advice is that officers should read the facts and adjudication reasons of as many Administrative Disapprovals as they can. What happened to others can (and will) happen to you. You may not always agree with the adjudications, as I often do not, but your agreement (and mine) is irrelevant. The reality is that this is what the Police Commission is doing, and you need to understand the lay of the land. It may help you avoid stepping on a land mine.

Doing this will not be a morale builder when you see the many ways that you can end up on the wrong side of a use of force, but it will make you more realistic in determining whether to use force, or how much force to use, and realize how your tactics are put under a microscope because of the use of force protocol. In the meantime, Officer Representation Section challenges many of these adjudications in Administrative Appeal Hearings, and it is not unusual for the League to finance a writ in the Superior Court challenging the Department’s decisions.

A 52 percent failure rate is a management failure. The Police Commission should be beating up management, not street cops. Officers are beaten up enough on the street when they try to enforce the law. The danger is that the Police Commission will make enforcing the law so hazardous to an officer’s career that proactive police work is discouraged. That is not good for the Department or the people of Los Angeles.

Be legally careful out there.

September 2017 Warning Bells article

De-escalation is not a tactic, it is a result

That is what I was told at the Force Science Institute’s two-day seminar on “Realistic De-escalation.” As you know, the Police Commission has insisted on modifying our Use of Force Policy to include de-escalation, and de-escalation has become the buzzword that will solve all the use of force problems nationwide if only those darn cops could be forced to use it! No matter that you have been using it your entire career, just not putting the word in your reports. So, we now have the word in our Use of Force Policy, and the Department has even published a directive called “Tactical De-escalation Techniques.” (Directive No. 16, October 2016)

Force Science Institute is a research group that is made up of physicians, psychologists, behavioral scientists, attorneys and other professionals who study human factors, movement, action/reaction times and how the mind works during rapidly unfolding events. They looked at de-escalation through scientific eyes, thus the title of their seminar: “Realistic De-escalation” (emphasis mine).

Force Science considers de-escalation to be an “outcome,” not a tactic. Tactics are important to de-escalation, but the ultimate goal, when possible, is to establish influence with the subject through communication to resolve the incident. Containment and control must exist to establish this communication, and it takes two parties, the officer and the suspect, to make it work. That is where the qualifier “realistic” comes in. The suspect can steal your reaction time. There may be no time to establish communication or influence.

Force Science Institute has conducted hundreds of tests on reaction times. A suspect six feet away from an officer can cover that distance in an average of .73 seconds. A punch or a kick can be delivered in .2 seconds, a knife slash in .14 seconds, a strike with a bat or club in .18 seconds, and gun draw from a waistband and subsequent firing of the weapon in .26 seconds. And because a novice with a gun points and shoots, the novice will have a hit rate of 77 percent, usually the face. Time compression can defeat de-escalation before you can say “one thousand one.” When the suspect steals your reaction time, immediate force may be the only answer you have left .

But if you are fortunate enough to establish containment, your next problem is to establish control. Your goal now becomes to establish communication with the suspect, build rapport and create influence. You then use the influence to resolve the problem. Now science steps in.

How do you create influence? First, forget about diagnosing the suspect. Whether the suspect is schizophrenic, manic depressive, brain damaged, chemically imbalanced or all four, it is not helpful for you to classify the malady, and it couldn’t be done even by a doctor without a battery of tests—so don’t try. What you need to determine, according to Force Science, is whether you can make contact with the suspect, i.e., communication on some level. You need the communication to establish the rapport, and you need the rapport to establish influence.

Watch the suspect. Is he defending his territory? If so, don’t invade his space. Does he have a fatal medical condition? Call an ambulance. What is his perspective? What is the goal of his activity in his mind? No matter how ridiculous it might be, it is the suspect’s reality. If the suspect’s thinking is contaminated because of delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking or mood disturbance, your words to the suspect may not even be processed by his brain. The suspect is not ignoring you, your words are just not penetrating his conscious. You must establish contact to get communication. A sharp, loud noise, such as a hand clap and shout of “hey!” followed by a calm voice, might break through and get his attention. No attention, no communication, and therefore, no influence.

Repeatedly yelling the same commands is not likely to be helpful and usually increases the tension, not only with the suspect but with the officers. While trying to help the suspect gain emotional control of himself, realize that there is another person who needs to maintain emotional control. That person is you. “Ask, tell, make” is something we have always been trained in, but it is usually ineffective in this type of situation and tends to quickly lead to a use of force. When dealing with suspects with mental problems, you need to know your own triggers as well as trying to determine theirs. When an officer’s ego goes up, an officer’s safety goes down.

Techniques, explained by Force Science, are to speak calmly and watch your nonverbal communication, such as body language and tone of voice. Convey respect for the suspect. Show compassion. It may help if you confirm the possibility that their delusion may be true in order to open a dialogue. Listen to what they are saying with active listening skills. Ask them questions about what is happening, why is it happening, has it happened before, and what does the suspect think can be done about it. Ask the suspect what he needs from us. Be creative, you are trying to establish the rapport that is needed as a foundation to exercise influence.

Once rapport has been established, the suspect may trust you enough to allow you to have an influence on the next things that need to happen, such as to put down the knife or submit to transportation to the hospital. However, Force Science cautions, NEVER let your guard down. Suspects with mental conditions can unpredictably explode and attack. Always have a plan in effect for that eventuality.

Hopefully these techniques work, but if they don’t, and the suspect steals your reaction time, you may have to use force, even deadly force. Now another skill must be employed, and that is effective report writing. The modern policing atmosphere means that you will be second-guessed, Monday-morning quarterbacked and probably sued. Take some time and put everything into your report, down to the smallest detail, of the efforts that you utilized to avoid the need to use force. That includes your planning on the way to the call to establish containment.

Remember, containment is the first step in de-escalation. No containment, no communication. No communication, no rapport. No rapport, no influence. No influence, no peaceful resolution. Explain where in this plan the suspect stole your reaction time, making your use of force necessary and reasonable.

The subject is complex, and more information can be obtained at Force Science’s website at And if you ever get the chance to attend their training, I highly recommend it.

Be legally careful out there.

AD Warning-Police Commission AD-Tactics [065-15]

SHORT STORY: Detectives A, Officers A and B observed a suspect holding a pistol out in an extended hand pointing in a westerly direction. The pistol moved backward twice as if being fired. Suspect ran and officers put out a backup on a shooting suspect and gave location and description. The detectives drove into an alley following the suspect at a distance of 15-20 yards. They momentarily lost sight of him and slowed their vehicle down. Suspect had scaled a fence and on the other side got stuck when his clothing got hung up in the fence.   As Officer A brought the vehicle to a stop, he advised Detective A and Officer B that the suspect had gone over the fence. He looked out his window and saw the suspects hand and a gun come over the fence and point at him. Officer A drew and fired twice through his passenger window, shattering it. Detective A exited the vehicle and ordered suspect to drop his gun. When he did not, Detective A fired 3 rounds and then saw the gun drop. Officer B put out a help call and the suspect was taken down from the fence and handcuffed. BOPC FINDING: AD Tactics: 1. Code Six. Detectives A and B did not advise Communications Division (CD) of their Code Six location.  The purpose of going Code Six is to advise CD and officers in the area of their location and the nature of the field investigation, should the incident escalate and necessitate the response of additional personnel. The BOPC determined that Detective A and B’s failure to ensure their personnel went Code Six was a substantial deviation without justification from approved Department tactical training. 2. Back Up / Help Call Detective A and Officers A and B requested Back-Up for a suspect that they knew was armed with a handgun and had likely just fired the weapon. Although officers are given discretion regarding the appropriate time to broadcast a request for additional resources based on the ongoing tactical situation, it would have been tactically advantageous for Officer B to broadcast a Help Call when he observed the suspect armed with a handgun in order to alert responding personnel of the seriousness of the incident. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined that Officer B’s actions did not substantially deviate from approved Department tactical training. 3. Pursuing Armed Suspects Detective A and Officers A and B pursued Subject 1, whom they knew was armed with a handgun. Containment of an armed suspect demands optimal situational awareness. The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution. In this case, Detective A and Officers A and B were in plainclothes in an unmarked vehicle when they observed Subject 1 armed with a handgun and began to follow him as he fled from the area. Although Officer B indicated that they were approximately 15 to 20 yards away from Subject 1 and that the officers indicated they were only tracking the suspect until they could establish a perimeter, in this circumstance it would have been more tactically prudent for the officers to hold their position and go into containment mode. It is the BOPC’s expectation that officers are decisive in their actions during a rapidly unfolding, life-threating situation while taking into consideration police work is inherently dangerous. In this case, the officers were attempting to minimize the continued threat to the public while dealing with a fleeing armed suspect. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the BOPC determined, that the actions of Detective A and Officers A and B were reasonable and not a substantial deviation from approved Department tactical training 4. Tactical Vehicle Deployment. Officer A stopped their police vehicle next to where he believed Subject 1 had climbed over the fence. Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively plan and approach each incident in a safe manner, keeping officer safety in mind at all times. Officers when faced with an ongoing tactical situation must remain alert to improve their overall safety, by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. Officer A stopped the police vehicle where he last observed Subject 1 climbing over a fence with the intent of establishing a perimeter in order to contain the suspect. However, unbeknownst to Officer A, Subject 1’s pants had become caught on the top of fence thus preventing him from being able to touch the ground or get down off the fence. The BOPC was particularly critical of Detective A, the supervising officer, who was in the vehicle with Officer A. The BOPC concluded that Detective A had a responsibility to prevent Officer A from continuing to follow the armed suspect further into the alley. In this incident, it would have been tactically prudent for Officer A to stop the vehicle, further away from Subject 1’s last known whereabouts in order to prevent placing himself or his partners at a tactical disadvantage. · The BOPC additionally considered the following: 1. Target Selection – According to Officer A, as he engaged Subject 1 with his service pistol he fired his weapon at the gun Subject 1 was holding in his hand, instead of aiming at the largest target, as officers are trained. Holding Service Pistol in Right Hand and Hand-Held Radio in Left Hand – Officer B drew his service pistol in his right hand while holding his hand-held radio in his left hand. Officers are reminded the tactical disadvantage of having a service pistol in one hand and an additional piece of equipment in the other hand. The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and that the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. In conducting an objective assessment of this incident, the BOPC found that the approval of a tactical plan without designated roles and responsibilities, coupled with the lack of sufficient supervisory oversight in the field by Detectives A and B as the incident unfolded was a substantial deviation without justification from approved Department tactical training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval. Additionally, the BOPC found that Officers A and B’s tactics did not substantially deviate from deviate from approved Department tactical training.

AD Warning-Police Commission AD-Tactics and U of F [57-15]

SHORT STORY: Officers responded to a radio call about a man breaking windows with a skateboard. Officers saw the broken window and observed the suspect walking and saw him swing the skateboard at a store window. Officers exited their vehicle and ordered the suspect to get on the ground. The suspect mounted his skateboard and skated away. The officers returned to their vehicle and followed the suspect. He would periodically fall off his skateboard, then get back on and continue down the street. When the suspect fell, Officer A, believing they had an opportunity to seize the skateboard, stopped the vehicle and told Officer B to grab it. Officer B exited the vehicle and ran toward the skateboard. So did the suspect. Officer A saw that Officer B was going to lose the race and feared the suspect would use the skateboard against his partner. He exited the vehicle and ran towards them. Officer B drew his pistol and ordered the suspect not to pick up the skateboard. Officer A arrived from the rear and grabbed suspect in a bear hug before he could pick up the skateboard. Officer B holstered. Suspects hands were under his body and the officers struggled with him to get his hands out and in cuffs. The officers eventually used blows to no effect. Officer A told Officer B to use the TASER. Officer B did so several times with no result. Officer A broadcast a help call.  Officer A was exhausted. Officer B, seeing that the TASER was having no success decided to grab the suspects legs. He could not holster the TASER because the holster was on his side that was on the ground. He placed the TASER up on a step and grabbed the suspect’s legs with his legs to try and control his kicking and tried to control one of the suspects arms. The suspect managed to get control of the TASER and started TASERing Officer B. Officer A heard Officer B screaming and shaking as well as hearing the TASER fire. Officer A felt his partner was incapacitated and being seriously injured along with the possibility that the suspect would be able to get Officer B’s gun because he could not see the suspect’s hands. Officer A drew his weapon, ordered the suspect to drop the TASER, and when he did not, he fired one round into the suspect’s back. The suspect ceased struggling. BOPC FINDINGS: AD on Tactics and AD on U of F:   Tactics: (1) did not wait for additional resources before making contact with the suspect; (2) failed to properly maintain control of the TASER; (3) additional considerations: (a) unnecessary spark test; (b) rib cage and back TASER application not best, should be arm, thigh, or calf; (3) no hobble or baton on person. U of F: it was not reasonable to believe that the suspect’s actions presented a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury.

AD Warning-Police Commission AD-Tactics-[056-15]

SHORT STORY: Suspect exited a truck, yelled “help me, help me” and wandered aimlessly in an intersection. He then got back in the truck and drove off until he fell out. The truck continued and crashed into a fence. Suspect stood up and walked into traffic. Then took off his shirt and began walking with a gallon of water in his hands. Witnesses called the police. Meanwhile the subject tried to get in the passenger side of a Port Police vehicle. He was prevented by the officer who thought he appeared to be a mad man. Suspect walked on the road and would throw objects at vehicles. Officers arrived and requested a backup. Officers sat the suspect down and handcuffed him using two pairs of handcuffs because of his large size.   Officers attempted to get the suspect in the police vehicle but he would not put his legs in and began kicking. He used his weight to push himself out of the vehicle and the officers guided him to the ground. Suspect began saying “heart attack-heart attack.” Officers used body weight to hold the suspect down as he was kicking and moving from side to side. Officers put a hobble restraint device on the suspect’s legs and placed him on his left side. A Rescue Ambulance was requested. Officers noted that the suspect did not appear to be breathing. They placed the suspect in the seated position, but still no pulse. CPR was begun. A breathing mask was also brought into use. A heartbeat was felt, but then again stopped. The RA arrived and took the suspect to the hospital, but he did not survive. BOPC FINDINGS: AD Tactics (1) did not update their location when looking for the suspect; (2) did not request an RA in a timely manner; (3) additionally considered (a) suspect told to place hands on hood to be in front of In-car-camera, hoods can be hot; (b) did not activate rear seat camera prior to trying to get suspect in vehicle; (c) did not have hobble restraint device on their person; (d) stepped on suspects foot for control, could lose balance.

AD Warning-Police Commission AD-Tactics and Unintentional Discharge [039-15]

SHORT STORY: Parole Compliance Unit officers went to a residence to arrest a parolee with desertion status. The officers formed up in a stick. An officer knocked on the door. He could see the suspect through the window running inside a rear bedroom. The officer’s forced the door and entered. Sergeant A went to the rear of the residence to watch the back window. When Officer A kicked the bedroom door, he had his pistol out and his finger slipped onto the trigger and he had an unintentional discharge. BOPC FINDING: AD Tactics and AD on UD: Tactics: (1) failure to communicate observations and intentions; (2) incomplete and inadequate operations plan; (3) failure to cover rear leaving Sergeant A alone to deal with possible armed suspect; (4) breached the door without requesting additional resources; (5) no request for a backup when suspect fled towards rear; (6) failure to contact SWAT for possibly armed barricaded suspect; UD: (1) finger on trigger when kicking door.

AD Warning-Police Commission AD-Tactics [038-15]

SHORT STORY: Officers received a radio call about a person and his dog causing a disturbance. Officers A and B responded. Officer B activated his body camera. Suspect and other persons with him showed signs of intoxication. Officers told the persons they would have to leave. Suspect yelled a racial slur at Officer A and left. Suspect walked to another open business, loitered out front and yelled racial epithets at people walking into the business. Officer A requested an additional unit. Suspect became involved in a minor scuffle with a witness. The witness pushed the suspect to the ground. Officers told the witness that they would deal with the suspect. Officers told the suspect to place his hands behind his back. Suspect yelled expletives and did not comply. Officers struggled with suspect and took him to the ground. Officer A believed that the suspect was trying to take possession of his partner’s gun and fired 2 rounds into the suspect. BOPC FINDINGS: AD on Tactics; AD on D & E; AD on U of F: Tactics: (1) did not discuss tactics prior to making contact; (2) crossfire; (3) did not handcuff and search suspect. D & E: (1) video did not show suspect’s hand near Officer B’s holster, no reasonable belief that situation would escalate to point where deadly force may be justified. U of F: (1) video did not show subject’s hand near Officer B’s holster and Officer B did not feel jerky movements on holster nor did Officer B make any statements or actions suggesting suspect was trying to take away his pistol.