Pre-1979 Department Policy
The Eulia Love report, published on October 4th, 1979, refers to the Department’s emphasis in training as on “the use of minimal force and the attempt to deescalate and defuse a situation wherever possible.” The Department policy for firearms is quoted as follows: “The Department policy regarding the use of firearms authorizes the use of deadly force only in the following three situations: (1) To protect (the officer),or others from an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) to prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place other persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or (3) to apprehend a ‘fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the risk of deadly force when there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is delayed. (Department Manual Section 1/556.40) The policy on the use of firearms provides clearly that deadly force shall be exercised only when all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or appear impracticable.”
The use of force investigation at that time, a special section of Robbery Homicide conducted an investigation surrounding the use of force if there was a hit, or a divisional sergeant conducted the investigation if it was a miss. A Department Shooting Review Board, consisting of three staff officers, then reviewed the matter and made a recommended finding. They could find (1) in policy; (2) in policy but fails to meet Department standards; (3) accidental; or (4) out of policy. The chief of police then rendered a decision and applied discipline if necessary.
1979 Post Eulia Love changes in Department Policy
The public furor that arose over the Eulia Love OIS on January 3, 1979, resulted in a change of policy in the adjudication of uses of force. The Eulia Love OIS facts and surrounding happenings are in this Warning Bells article. The commission report found that the officers drew their weapon prematurely, fired too many rounds, and were not properly trained. This differed with the finding of the 2 to 3 majority in the Department Shooting Review Board and Chief Gates. Significantly, the commission also found that the LAPD use of force policy, if “properly implemented” had no inadequacies.
The commission decided that “substantial changes are required in the system of investigating and adjudicating officer-involved-shootings and other use of force incidents.” It assumed direct responsibility for the adjudication of all officer-involved-shooting incidents and from this point on would make the final determination in all such cases. The Shooting Review Board was renamed the Use of Force Review Board, its jurisdiction was expanded, an additional staff officer, and a line officer (peer) were added to the panel as voting members.
The commission also decided that the method of judging a use of force without reference to its components was confusing and unclear. Tactics were not separated from the use of force and were inconsistently applied as affecting the adjudication of the propriety of the use of force itself. An evaluation of the entire pattern of officer conduct was needed, the commission determined. The Use of Force review board was directed to evaluate each aspect of an officer-involved-shooting by including separate evaluations of drawing and exhibiting, the use of force, and the tactics before, during, and following the use of force. This was the beginning of the method by which uses of force are adjudicated by the three categories.
July 14, 2009 Revision of Department Policy
Chief Bratton felt that the Use of Force Policy needed to be updated and he convened a Use of Force Best Practices Committee and the Board of Police Commissioners convened a Use of Force Sub-committee to review and recommend changes in the use of force policy. Several years of research was conducted. Nationwide department use of force policies were collected and reviewed including policies from the Department of the Treasury and Justice. The recommendations of the International Association of Chief’s of Police (IACP) were heavily replied upon and a revision of the policy was formed. On June 23, 2009, a fact sheet was prepared and submitted to the Police Commission explaining the research that was done and the reasons for a revision of a proposed policy. One problem was that the use of force policy was spread out over 14 manual sections. Another problems was that the use of force policy was not consistent with the recommendations of the IACP. The Graham v Connor standard of objective reasonableness was adopted as the basis of a revised use of force policy because it “will enable Department personnel who use force to better articulate their actions and the reasons for those actions. Reliance on the objective reasonableness standard will enable force investigators to make better inquiries and will result in more thorough investigations. Finally, reliance on the objective reasonableness standard will provide adjudicators with a common ground to evaluate use of force incidents.”
The recommended policy was approved by the Board of Police Commissioners on July 14, 2009. The training program was revised and officers were trained on the policy and its application.
April 2, 2014 – Hayes addition to Use of Force Policy
In February of 2014, the Inspector General issued a report recommending that the LAPD Use of Force Policy be amended to incorporate issues raised in the case of Hayes v. County of San Diego. It added a single line to the policy, “The reasonableness of an officer ‘s use of deadly force includes consideration of the officer ‘s tactical conduct and decisions leading up to the use of deadly force.” The Inspector General’s recommendation was adopted by the Police Commission on March 4, 2014 and Special Order No. 4 was issued by the Department on April 2, 2014. This single line grafted California negligence law onto a use of force policy based on Federal constitutional law standards. It allowed the Police Commission to rule a use of force itself out of policy based on perceived tactical errors that occurred prior to the use of force. [For an extensive discussion of this issue see the Warning Bells article 08-2015]
April 18, 2017 – De-escalation added to the Use of Force policy
Special Order No. 5. added this language on de-escalation. “Officers shall attempt to control an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to de-escalate the situation, whenever it is safe and reasonable to do so.” The order also amended the factors used to determine reasonableness. “The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable.”
February 5, 2020 – Use of Force policy changed to conform to new state law, 835 (a)
On January 1, 2020, the legislature changed the state use of force law by amending 835 (a) of the Penal Code. This caused the Department to once again change the Use of Force policy. Special Order 4 (do not confuse with SO 4 of 2014) was issued to take effect on 2/5/2020. “Feasible” was added to preamble in the de-escalation requirement. De-escalation was emphasized in other sections. Language in 835 (a) was incorporated into SO 4. See March, 2020 Warning Bells article for a discussion of the changes.