A Matter of Perspective?
The public and all too often Department management seem to find it difficult to stand in an officer’s shoes. For instance, think about this question: How many gunshots are necessary in a shooting situation? It’s a mathematical question for those not involved in the shooting. Averages are calculated and compared, past shootings are examined and percentages are determined. Criteria are constructed and Monday-morning quarterbacking runs wild.
On the other hand, the criteria of those involved in a shooting situation for the number of shots fired are radically different. The boots-on-the-ground answer is simple: As many shots as it takes to end the danger. You only count so that you know when to reload.
Standby for the next flavor-of-the-month Department program to control your actions on the street. The inspector general (IG) recently completed the second quarter Use of Force Report. It focuses on multiple-officer shootings. The IG has noted that there has been an increase in high round-count officer-involved-shootings. It turns out that there has been more “over 60-shot shootings” this year than in the previous five years.
Paradoxically, there have been fewer officer-involved shooting incidents this year than in any of the previous five years. Incidents are down 58 percent compared to last year. Hmmmm. Fewer shootings; more shots. What does that mean?
The IG admitted that the 60-round incidents were all within policy and that officers have a right to defend themselves, but expressed concern that high-round cases involve rapid inaccurate fire that increases risks to the safety of bystanders and other officers. Also of concern is the depletion of ammunition and the difficulty of distinguishing officer fire from suspect fire, the IG added.
Statistically, the number of incidents where 20 rounds per incident were fired had doubled from previous years and the number of incidents where 60 rounds per incident had been fired more than quadrupled. Furthermore, the average individual officer fired three times as many rounds per incident than in previous years.
Logically, the overwhelming number of high round-count shooting incidents occurred at the end of pursuits. That brings up the examination of pursuit policy. The IG found two major concerns: the post-pursuit policy and coordination and the number of officers involved in the pursuit. Take heed.
Warning Bell #1
The IG has directed the Use of Force Boards to consider whether Department post-pursuit policies have been followed. In particular, the IG wants more attention as to “whether incident commanders properly assumed command and control of the scene, as well as extent to which officers exercised fire control.”
What is the post-pursuit policy? Manual Section 4/205.35 says this:
“Safety is critical at the termination of a pursuit, therefore, the need for decisive action, self-control, and strict personal discipline is essential. The responsibility for maintaining control and directing activities at the termination point of a vehicle pursuit must remain with the senior officer in the primary unit unless relieved by a supervisor. The officers in the secondary unit shall be responsible for backing up the primary unit and broadcasting pertinent information at the termination of the pursuit. Unless summoned to the scene, officers in all other units shall remain clear of the pursuit termination point.”
The IG also notes that individual officers in multiple officer shootings fire more rounds per incident than one or two officer-involved-shootings. That goes to the issue of fire control, according to the IG. The report noted that supervisors on the scene (or senior officers at the scene) were deficient in forming tactical plans. The LAPD Basic Firearms Manual, the IG says, tells officers to balance speed with accuracy and that the need for firing every shot must be articulated. Officers should have a proper sight picture, assess the targets location or actions, and manage available ammunition. In other words, “spray and pray” is not authorized.
The IG has directed the Department to examine all of the above issues. Guess what questions Force Investigation Division detectives are going to be asking you if your OIS involves a pursuit, and/or multiple shooters?
Warning Bell #2
LAPD pursuit policy only authorizes three vehicles in the ordinary pursuit: the primary, the secondary and the supervisor. The supervisor can authorize additional units, but the grounds are unclear. Furthermore, although other units are to be aware of the location of the pursuit they are NOT allowed to parallel the pursuit.
The IG has directed the Department to inquire into these issues in an officer-involved shooting investigation. Guess what questions Force Investigation Division detectives are going to be asking you if there are more than three police cars at the end of the pursuit?
You are also going to be studied. Researchers from Northwestern University are going to analyze data about these shootings. The microscope is coming out. Beware.
New policy and training parameters for officers are going to be developed. These include fire control and accuracy issues, pursuit policies for bringing additional units into a pursuit, end-of-pursuit command and control responsibilities for senior officers and supervisors, and who knows what the researchers will come up with. Think of all these things the next time you turn on that siren.
The real training should be given to the suspects. Don’t run. End of problem. Or maybe if the Department can’t treat officers involved in high-stress situations with more understanding and less pressure, don’t chase. Also end of problem.
Be legally careful out there.
